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Liberal egalitarian theories of distributive 
justice focus predominantly on determin-
ing what a just society owes its citizens in 
terms of material resources (such as mon-
ey), opportunities (such as the chance to 
obtain an education, to secure employment, 
to buy insurance, and to participate in po-
litical life), welfare, or capabilities. Howev-
er, they tend to say nothing directly about 
the time people have available to pursue 
the ends they choose. Julie L. Rose’s Free 
Time spotlights this omission.
Rose’s specific concern is, as the title 
of her book indicates, free time, defined 
as “the time beyond that which it is ob-
jectively necessary for one to spend to 
meet one’s own basic needs, or the basic 
needs of one’s dependents, whether with 
necessary paid work, household labor, or 
personal care” (p. 58). Working within the 
boundaries of liberal egalitarianism that is 
committed to anti-paternalism, anti-per-
fectionism, and state neutrality (pp. 27–
30), Rose argues forcefully that free time 
should be regarded as a separate and vital 
resource or opportunity, alongside money 
and other goods that figure prominently 
in theories of distributive justice. She fur-
ther attempts, in a less developed way, to 
draw out the implications of recognizing 
free time as an independent concern for 
distributive justice in regulating working 
hours, as well as in assisting caregivers 
generally and parents specifically.
But, why have liberal egalitarian theo-
ries of distributive justice ignored free time 
in the first place? After all, it is during those 
hours in the day when we are not sleeping, 
doing housework, buying essentials, and 
earning enough “to attain a basic level of 
functioning in one’s society” (p. 58) when 
almost all of what we really care about 
occurs. Rose offers two explanations for 
this neglect.
In Chapter 2, Rose provides a very good 
and useful summary of what political phi-
losophers, such as John Rawls (1974 and 
subsequent writings), Michael Walzer (1983) 
and Phillipe Van Parijs (1995), have said on 
the topic. She characterizes these discus-
sions as being about time as a specific good 
(which she labels as ‘leisure’), whereas she 
is concerned with time as a general good 
(which she labels as ‘free time’) and thus 
as a resource in its own right (a claim de-
fended in Chapter 3). The distinction be-
tween specific and general goods is that 
the former are “particular goods that one 
requires to pursue one’s particular con-
ception of the good,” while the latter are 
“all-purpose means that one generally re-
quires to pursue one’s conception of the 
good, whatever it may be” (p. 27. Emphasis 
in the original).
In Chapter 4, the book’s “normative 
core,” however, Rose offers a different 
and more appealing explanation. Liberal 
egalitarians, namely, assume that if money, 
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opportunities, or other resources are dis-
tributed justly, everyone will have plenty of 
time left to spend as they please, whether 
in play, additional work, civic or religious 
activity, or whatever else matters to them. 
The time-money substitutability claim, 
Rose contends, is mistaken.
The time-money substitutability claim 
is false because it rests, according to Rose, 
on two further assumptions, both of which 
are false. The first assumption is the per-
fect divisibility of labor demand: namely, 
the assumption that “all individuals can 
freely choose to reduce their hours of paid 
work to the level they prefer” (p. 68). This 
assumption is empirically untrue: most 
employees cannot decide to work short-
er hours if they like for reduced pay, jobs 
often specify working hours with little 
or no flexibility, and a variety of factors 
push employers to demand more rather 
than fewer hours from their workers, of-
ten in the form of nondiscretionary over-
time (pp. 77–80).
The second mistaken assumption is 
the perfect substitutability of money and 
basic needs satisfaction which holds that 
“all individuals can unobjectionably meet 
their household and bodily basic needs by 
purchasing goods or services in the mar-
ketplace” (p. 68). However, some activi-
ties cannot be bought with money, such as 
sleeping or grooming, and for those whose 
(special) needs are extremely time-con-
suming to satisfy money is of no use (pp. 
81–83). Moreover, under some social cir-
cumstances, Rose argues, hiring somebody 
to help meet one’s household or bodily 
needs presents a threat to civic equality. 
Even when those (unspecified) social cir-
cumstances do not obtain, “citizens may 
reasonably believe that hiring the services 
of another to meet their household and 
caregiving needs may undermine the per-
sonal goods of commitment and intimacy 
in their relationships, degrade the value of 
the labor itself, or injure their own person-
hood” (pp. 83–84).
Chapter 4, furthermore, offers a de-
fense of the book’s central claim: all cit-
izens are entitled, as a matter of justice, 
to their fair share of free time. The core 
argument relies on the widely endorsed ef-
fective freedoms principle, which states that 
legal freedoms are not enough for liberals: 
citizens need to be able to effectively use 
their formal liberties and opportunities. 
Free time is, hence, a precondition for the 
effective freedom to participate in poli-
tics, religion, and family life, as well as to 
exercise central rights such as freedom of 
speech, assembly, association, and occu-
pation. Far from being trivial or illiberal, 
free time is necessary both for autonomy 
and for access to most of the fundamental 
liberal rights (pp. 69–74).
If we have a right to free time, as Rose 
argues, what institutional and policy chang-
es would follow? The last two chapters of 
the book attempt to sketch out some of 
the implications.
In Chapter 5, Rose argues that for free 
time to be useful, at least a significant por-
tion of it must be made available in a way 
that allows people to take real advantage of 
their freedom of association. Rose surveys 
three possibilities to accomplish this goal: 
universal basic income, mandated flexible 
working hours, and a common period of 
free time. Providing a universal basic in-
come that offers abundant free time to 
all, however, may not be economically or 
politically feasible. Complete discretion 
over working hours, similarly, is likely to 
prove impractical. Rose, thus, advocates 
for a common period of free time, such as 
Sunday closing laws. In order to avoid her 
proposal from conflicting with economic 
and religious liberty, Rose argues that vol-
untary work on a rest day will generally not 
be prohibited; rather, what is important is 
that workers are able to refuse to work on 
Sundays. So, it is access to a common pe-
riod of free time that is guaranteed. As for 
those who would have to work on Sun-
days anyway – such as the police, nurses 
and medical doctors, childcare providers, 
and transportation workers – they should 
do so voluntarily or on a shared rotation, 
Rose argues, and employers could be pro-
hibited from inquiring about someone’s 
willingness to work on Sundays or from 
providing a higher salary or benefits to 
those who do, to further protect a person’s 
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right to effective freedom of association 
(pp. 93–111).
Chapter 6, finally, aims to show that 
free time must be guaranteed to caregiv-
ers generally, and specifically (and more 
controversially) to parents. Many people, 
the vast majority of whom are women, re-
linquish some of their free time to care for 
others. Focusing particularly on the time 
parents spend on caring for their children, 
Rose recognizes that some liberals believe 
that children “are personal projects like any 
other, and parents have no more claim to 
additional public support to pursue their 
particular conceptions of the good than 
do any other citizens” (p. 120). Without 
offering new arguments, however, Rose 
endorses the opposing claim that children 
are public goods; those who benefit from 
childrens’ existence should contribute to 
the cost of bearing, raising, and educating 
them (pp. 120–123).
Not surprisingly, Rose concludes that 
citizens with caregiving responsibilities are 
entitled to either (i) publicly funded care – 
that is, publicly funded (though not nec-
essarily publicly provided) care services 
that are either free at the point of use or 
heavily subsidized for those engaged in 
full-time work, or (ii) publicly funded in-
come subsidies – that is, publicly funded 
payments made to those caring for oth-
ers directly and full-time. The first op-
tion provides citizens with a break from 
the demands of caring, while the second 
option provides citizens with disposable 
income. Rose also contends that citizens 
must be provided with (iii) workplace ac-
commodation – that is, regulations that 
provide periods of publicly funded paid 
leave, part-time contracts, and flexible 
working hours (pp. 124–126). After all, to 
deny people the time and resources for di-
rect caregiving would be to deprive them of 
one of their legitimate interests; to commit 
them to full-time caregiving would be to 
deny them occupational choice.
Free Time is certainly an admirable de-
fense of a neglected issue in political phi-
losophy. Although there is much to agree 
with, there are some pressing concerns. 
Due to limited space and the density of 
Rose’s arguments, I shall only mention 
one substantive and two strategic.
Perhaps the most vexing issue is that 
Rose focuses throughout the book on the 
amount of free time citizens have per week. 
She is mysteriously silent, however, as to 
why (only) such a way of measuring our free 
time should be relevant. For, wouldn’t the 
amount of free time a person has across her 
adult lifetime be an equally (if not more) 
appropriate concern? Imagine Anne and 
Becky, both at the age of 25. They have 
exactly the same working hours and same 
caregiving responsibilities throughout 
the week; likewise, they spend the same 
amount of time on other necessary activi-
ties, such as personal care. In other words, 
they have an equal amount of free time per 
week. The difference between Anne and 
Becky, however, is that Anne will only live 
for another five years, whereas Becky will 
live to be 80 years old. With her shorter 
lifespan, Anne suffers a corresponding free 
time deficit; that is, Anne will have less free 
time overall. What would be a fair share 
of free time for a person who is expected 
to live 30 years only and for a person who 
is expected to live 80 years?
Even if we were provided with an ar-
gument to the effect that it is free time per 
week that matters normatively, two strate-
gic worries arise. First, Rose’s approach to 
liberal egalitarianism is highly ecumenical. 
Her characterization of liberal theories of 
distributive justice is intended to encom-
pass an impressive array of the most influ-
ential contemporary contributions: from 
John Rawls’s justice as fairness, Ronald 
Dworkin’s equality of resources, Richard 
Arneson’s equal opportunity to welfare, G. 
A. Cohen’s access to advantage, to Eliza-
beth Anderson’s version of the capabilities 
approach. Adopting such a wide-ranging 
theoretical framework serves well for Rose’s 
main end: namely, to establish that citizens 
have a justice claim to their fair share of 
free time. Nonetheless, it downplays the 
important differences within the family 
of liberal egalitarian theories of distribu-
tive justice, especially the diverse stances 
on the question of responsibility for our 
choices (such as where we live, which jobs 
304 │ PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY, VOL. 29, NO. 2
we accept, which skills we develop, or 
whether children are rightly seen as pub-
lic goods). Thus, while a liberal egalitarian 
might agree with the book’s key claim, she 
might vehemently disagree with the im-
plications Rose herself develops.
Furthermore, Rose’s (legitimate) de-
cision to explore some issues rather than 
others may leave the reader wanting. One 
can easily find examples throughout the 
book that point out to other interesting, 
and perhaps even very radical, implications 
for distributive justice. Consider just one 
example from the book. An heiress who 
obtains a large fortune does not only gain 
materially over other members of society 
but also gains in terms of free time. With 
her wealth, she is not required to work in 
the same way that other members of soci-
ety are. Even if she works 40 or 50 hours 
per week she does so as part of her free 
time; work for her is effectively a leisure 
activity (albeit one for which she also gains 
materially) (pp. 42–43). The radical impli-
cation of the heiress having more than her 
fair share of free time could be that such 
inheritances should be taxed at very high 
rates to equalize access to free time. Yet, 
this issue remains untreated.
Perhaps these two strategic worries are 
not disadvantageous at all; they can be seen 
as an invitation for liberal egalitarians of 
various stripes to engage with Rose’s prin-
cipal idea in more detail. Rose has, after 
all, opened an important new area of en-
quiry for those thinking about distributive 
justice. So, while there is certainly much 
more to say on this topic still, I hope that 
Rose’s book gets the readership it deserves, 
influences law-makers to reconsider some 
of the ways in which societies are struc-
tured, and helps citizens to receive their 
fair share of free time (whether per week 
or during a lifetime).
